

Donor Politics in Zambia: Promoting Poverty Reduction or Fuelling Neopatrimonialism?

by Walter Eberlei

40 years into independence, the developmental record of Zambia and many other African countries is extremely weak. Since at least the mid-1970s, the socio-economic decline seems to find no end. The number of poor people has never been higher than today. And this despite four decades of development cooperation including massive aid flows. What is the impact of aid on Zambia's development? While donors argue that international aid has helped to avoid an even worse collapse, independent observers tend to assess development cooperation as having shown very little impact if at all or, even more critical, as having contributed to Zambia's downfall.

Without giving its own perspective on the long-term impact of aid prematurely, this study intends to contribute to the debate on whether or not the *Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS)* approach – introduced in Zambia in 2000 – has led to a new quality of relations between national and international actors based on lessons learned from the previous phases of development cooperation. Assuming that it has raises the simple question, whether this new quality makes any meaningful difference in terms of favouring the poor in reality. Referring to a brief review of current literature as well as an analysis of new international donors' policies, the first chapter sets the stage for the case study. The following empirical work is based on the analysis of government and donor documents as well as numerous in-depth interviews conducted during several research visits in Zambia between 2002 and 2005.

1. International aid and neopatrimonial politics

As one element of structural adjustment, the World Bank and others demanded *good governance* in a technocratic sense, understanding the state's role as efficient implementing agency of the

'right' macro-economic policy (World Bank 1989: 55 f.). Retrospectively, it is debatable if donor politics during the last 20 years have strengthened the political preconditions for successful poverty reduction efforts. Following academic views published in recent years, the predominant answer is: not at all. According to Thandika Mkandawire, the structural adjustment phase in Africa left 'choiceless democracies' behind. Though following formal democratic rules – especially elections – these countries are not in the position to determine own objectives and instruments. In his view, the countries are ruled by an alliance of donors and government technocrats, who bear a limited understanding of *good governance* and tend to undermine democratic institutions like parliaments as well as societal participation (Mkandawire 1999: 126-129). Richard Joseph shares this view of an ever-growing alliance between African leaders and external agencies emerging since the late 1980s. Joseph argues, though, that this alliance is not the result of having no choice but of a clear interests-based decision by regimes "deliberately contrived to satisfy prevailing international norms of 'presentability'" (1998: 4). In order to secure their political survival and therefore to please the international community, African elites organised 'virtual democracies'. Rainer Tetzlaff states similarly that African neopatrimonial regimes were only able to survive through the permanent maintenance from outside (2003: 484). Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz argue that African elites "developed strategies for instrumentalizing dependence politically to their advantage". By "exploiting the weaknesses of, and the divisions between" their donors, they were "maximizing foreign aid and minimizing constraints on its use" (1999: 112, 115).

Nicolas van de Walle also shares the view that donor money strengthened "neopatrimonial tendencies" (the introductory article in this volume discusses the neopatrimonialism thesis extensively). Based on broad comparative research, van de Walle argues: "The institutionalisation of crisis management over a twenty-year period has dis-empowered central administrations for the benefit of donor experts and ad hoc domestic decision-making structures", going hand in hand with an "increase in corruption and rent-seeking and a weakening of mechanisms of accountability and transparency that serve to limit such abuses" (2001: 275-276).

According to the above presented views, aid mechanisms and failed conditionalities combined with rent seeking and corrupt

political establishments have had disastrous consequences for development and poverty reduction in Africa during the last decades. In her analysis of developments in Zambia during the 1990s, Lise Rakner confirms these findings: “The Zambian case study suggests that if a recipient country (in part) follows the economic policy prescriptions, lack of adherence to principles of democracy will not be challenged by the donors. Thus, the pattern of partial political and economic reforms was reinforced by continued donor support” (2003: 18).

The afore-mentioned authors have identified a number of basic mistakes of international aid during the recent decades, all of them interlinked and influencing the precondition of *good governance*.¹ They can be summarised in three categories.

Focus on elites: Since independence, governments “loudly and successfully demanded a complete monopoly over aid resources”, which led to the effect that “donors aided governments, not their populations” (van de Walle 2001: 196). This elite-orientation of development aid perceived the poor as recipients or target groups of joint government-donor interventions only. Authoritarian governments led by neopatrimonial political elites received support from donors to an extent that “made them less vulnerable to the absence of domestic legitimacy” (ibid.: 227). This narrow focus was even maintained after the so-called ‘democratisation wave’ in Africa. Moreover, this focus combined with a limited technocratic governance concept, which is directed at public sector management, sees participation as a technical exercise and does not touch any real power issues and democratisation of decision-making (Mkandawire 1999: 126-129).

Donor-driven operational basis: Cooperation was based on policy blueprints imposed by the donors (especially regarding macro-economic frameworks and structural economic issues). This donor-driven procedure led to the “final decline of national economic planning and budgeting in most African countries” (van de Walle 2001: 228). The - at least partial - implementation of these economically focused donor plans was followed by an enormous increase of aid flows, serving the interests of the elites and their

¹ Some of these academic views were also considered in the “aid effectiveness debate” during the late 1990s, although in a more technocratic sense (cf. Burnside & Dollar 1998, Devajaran et. al 2001).

political survival (cf. Chabal/Daloz 1999: 120-123). Van de Walle outlines that political elites have absorbed the external reform pushes in a way that did not only avoid a substantial reduction of their influence and power but, on the contrary, strengthened them (2001: 273-286).

Traditional aid modalities: A number of deficits and shortcomings within traditional aid modalities are frequently mentioned as being responsible for weakening many African states' capacities for rational planning processes.² Among them are:

- weak coordination among donors, if at all;
- small and isolated bilateral projects, following more or less donor priorities;
- rapid proliferation of aid agencies with their various own procedures, creating plenty of coordination problems and lots of managerial burden to administrations;
- off-budget aid that was difficult to plan with and to monitor and easily accessible for government officials as goods feeding the neopatrimonial networks;
- the export of accountability and transparency to donor capitals, and especially to Washington, leaving less room and capacity for government administrations and parliaments to control rent-seeking activities of officials.

The question then arises if the PRS approach offers a chance for a meaningful departure from past donor mistakes in order to enable successful poverty reduction politics.

2. A new approach to development cooperation?

Since the PRS approach was introduced in 1999, there is an ongoing debate about whether the principle of *country ownership* has found its way into the real business between donors and a country like Zambia, or whether it has been mere rhetoric. Two arguments seem to support the critical perspective. First, the fact that the national strategies have to be endorsed by the boards of the IMF and the World Bank is very often criticised. The result of this requirement becomes apparent in the PRSP documents: From the very beginning, the countries formulate their strategy by anticipating the potential

² For examples see among many others van de Walle (2001: 200-201), Chabal/ Daloz (1999: 121); OECD (2001: 80-81); Booth (2003: 152).

expectations of the IMF and World Bank. Therefore, one finds many similarities between the finished PRSPs to date. The vocabulary – e.g. “pro-poor growth” – is drawn from the current international debate. There are no surprising strategic elements, nor any major changes of previous government policies. The second argument points to the aid dependency of African governments, which is extremely high. In many countries, donors finance between 40 and 60 percent of the annual government budget. These are circumstances under which *ownership* seems to be a highly questionable concept.

However, the international donor community has made various policy decisions to improve the basis for cooperation with developing countries. In reflecting the UN *Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)*, the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) published *Guidelines on Poverty Reduction* that are encouraging a reorientation of development cooperation towards an “institutional alignment with poverty reduction” (OECD 2001: 13). Taking the aforementioned fundamental shortcomings of traditional international aid into consideration, the elements of the new PRS approach will be discussed, firstly and briefly in a more general perspective, and, secondly in the light of the Zambian experience.

Stakeholder perspective: Cooperation under the traditional aid approach was primarily focussed on governments and political elites. The populations of developing countries or – more specifically ‘the poor’ – were simply treated as target groups for interventions. The new principle of *country ownership* does not grant governments alone the responsibility for the strategy but emphasises the close connection with the participation of various societal stakeholders, especially within civil society. Some government actors in the South, interested in preserving the status quo and being sceptical of civil society participation as such, contest this understanding frequently. But, lined up against this view is a broad coalition of reform oriented politicians, government officials and civil society actors in the South as well as donors who see participation as an essential part of country ownership (cf. Booth 2003, Introduction). The DAC guidelines express a well-defined new position: “The active participation of a range of partners and the empowerment of the poor are vital” (OECD 2001: 11). This includes not only a limited consultation exercise with a few capital-based professional NGOs; it also develops a different perspective, enabling bottom-up planning processes and perceiving ‘the poor’ as empowered partners with democratic rights.

This new approach seems to embed a concept of *good governance* in a broader democratic sense.³ The DAC guidelines illustrate the new understanding, which is, theoretically, a clear departure from the technocratic view prevailing in the past: “The main issues for governance in reducing poverty are ensuring that both poor men and women have greater influence in policy-making and greater access to basic services of decent quality. In this respect increasing women’s access requires specific attention, strategies and resources” (ibid.: 61). The new governance perspective has not only found its way into fundamental donor principles but also into the PRS papers. A recently undertaken desk study regarding PRS documents of 54 countries showed clearly that the link between poverty reduction and governance issues in general is integrated into almost all existing *Poverty Reduction Strategies* worldwide.⁴ The question remains, whether the reality reflects the broad-based democratic understanding, including empowerment of the poor, or is still in line with the old and more technocratic view.

Operational basis: For decades, the donors defined their own strategies for the recipient countries. The IMF and the World Bank especially, but also bilateral donors exported their blueprints (*Policy Framework Papers, Country Assistance Strategies*) for developing countries in a ‘take it or leave it’ posture. According to PRS theory, this has changed. The DAC guidelines formulate: “Agency programmes should, first and foremost, build on partner country development frameworks. (...) The emerging national poverty reduction strategies should be the point of departure for external assistance” (OECD 2001: 23, 71 ff.). The new approach does not only reflect a different procedural view, it also implies a different perspective as regards content. While the traditional scheme was predicated on the premise that economic principles determine development strategies (from the 1980s onwards the *Washington Consensus*), the new approach is, at least theoretically, based on a

³ See Mkandawires (2004) brief description of different governance concepts, or Cherus more elaborated discussion of democracy and governance issues (2002: 33-63).

⁴ Only 6 out of the total of 54 countries make no mention of it in their PRS (see Eberlei/Führmann 2004: 5). The study gives special attention to corruption: Ninety percent of 34 countries with Full-PRSP address the issue of corruption in their strategies.

poverty analysis within the respective country and the question how poverty reduction efforts can show meaningful results.

Table 1: PRS - A new approach to development cooperation?		
	Traditional aid approach	A new approach to aid
Stakeholder perspective	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Donors & Govts / Elites, 1990s: plus big development NGOs, selected business stakeholders ▪ Top-down arrangements, perceiving the poor as target groups ▪ Limited technocratic understanding of Governance ▪ Participation as a technical exercise leaving power issues untouched 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Govts, Parliaments, Community-based (civil) societies, private sector, donors ▪ Bottom-up dynamics, perceiving the poor as empowered partners ▪ Broad democratic understanding of Governance ▪ Support of participatory, democratic processes, aiming at peoples' empowerment
Operational basis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Individual donors' strategy blueprints (e.g. PFP, CAS) ▪ Premise: (Neo-liberal) Economic principles determine development strategies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Alignment of donor strategies with country-driven PRS ▪ Premise: A country-based poverty analysis determines development strategies
Aid modalities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Coordination (if at all) ▪ Projects, small bilateral programmes, (partly) following donor priorities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Harmonisation and Alignment ▪ Aid integrated in country structures (sectors, budget, decentralised bodies...), contributing to PRS implementation
© Walter Eberlei		

Aid modalities: The traditional aid approach with its focus on projects and small programmes following donor priorities, limited coordination (if at all); and, moreover, its chaotic diversity of conditionalities, rules and procedures has raised abundant criticism in the past. According to the new approach, the development assistance of single donors is not only coordinated with other donors, but harmonised with the work of all other 'external development partners' to support the implementation of the PRS jointly. This important principle is based on the *Rome Declaration on*

Harmonization of bilateral and multilateral donors, approved in February 2003. To serve this purpose, donors' strategies, procedures and practices are to be reformed, e.g. by stronger coordination and even reciprocal delegation of tasks, more flexibility, strengthening of governments to take the lead in poverty reduction, harmonisation of all donor procedures, joint financing instruments (like budget support, sector-wide approaches and others). The DAC has published detailed proposals to illustrate what this could mean in practice (cf. OECD 2003).

Recapitulating the above, the theoretical positions of the international donor community reflect a new approach to development cooperation. The Zambian case study will hopefully throw more light on whether the donors practice what they preach.

3. Changing donor cooperation with Zambia?

Zambia has always received relatively strong external support. During the 1960s and early 1970s, a broad range of donors supported the Kaunda Government and the strong role of the state in development (cf. Meyns 1995). Due to the new global neo-liberal paradigm on the one hand, and the growing criticism of Kaunda's authoritarian behaviour on the other hand, the majority of donors took an increasingly critical stance vis-à-vis Zambia during the 1980s. However, a number of bilateral donors even increased the aid flows, thereby neutralising the pressure to adjust.

The democratic change from Kaunda to Chiluba was strongly applauded by the donor community. "The donor community found in Zambia a potential success case for the new 'dual conditionality agenda'" (consisting in parallel economic and political liberalisation) (Rakner 2003: 22). Already during his campaign, Chiluba propagated a tough economic programme in line with IMF requirements (cf. Meyns 1995). And in fact, after his election he started with draconic adjustment measures, among them significant cuts in state expenditure; abolishment of subsidies (e.g. for fertiliser); retrenchment of civil servants; introduction of fees for health services; liberalisation of the national financial market, of the exchange rate and foreign trade; privatisation of state enterprises (cf. Eberlei / Siebold 2002: 34-36).

But the honeymoon between the Chiluba regime and the external actors ended soon, giving way to another period of tough

negotiations. In 1995, Zambia and the IMF agreed upon a new three years *Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF)*. The IMF acclaimed what it considered the ‘successful’ completion of the preceding programme and, thus, encouraged the Government to continue with its tough adjustment programme - unimpressed by the growing poverty figures in Zambia or by the increasing political criticism. Contrarily, several bilateral donors became more and more critical regarding the political developments in Zambia (e.g. constitutional changes to secure Chiluba’s power and to suppress internal opposition). Some of them suspended their bilateral aid in full or partly, while the IMF, the World Bank and others continued lending on the basis of good economic results. But the critical bilaterals were not able to push their perspective through. “In Zambia, the concern for the economic reform programme won over the principle of political liberalisation and democratic consolidation”, writes Rakner (2003: 165) and concludes: “The MMD government appeared as the main ‘winner’ of the two-level game in terms of power consolidation” (ibid: 184).⁵ Years later the World Bank Evaluations Department acknowledged that aid flows to fuel the Chiluba regime had even hindered sustainable economic reforms (cf. World Bank OED 2002: 2).

The 1999 agreement with the IMF still reflects the dominant neoliberal economic perspective (as did the World Bank’s *Country Assistance Strategy, CAS*, 1999). The *Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies*, basis for a new ESAF agreement, did not set a new course. One paragraph of the nine-page document mentioned the *Zambian National Poverty Reduction Plan*, which had been developed after the UN Social Summit in Copenhagen 1995, but the challenges of economic reform, political reform and poverty reduction were not linked in any way (GRZ 1999: 1). At this point, several Zambian civil society actors had already argued frequently and sharply that the traditional structural adjustment programmes contributed to a massive spread of poverty in Zambia (cf. Kufekisa 2001; McCollim 2001). Even the IMF ESAF evaluation, published in 1998, pinpointed the negative social and economic effects of the

⁵ Rakner argues in her study with Putnam’s model of two-level games, which means, “political leaders are constantly playing the domestic and international arenas simultaneously.” (2003: 18, see also p. 42)

programmes during the 1990s (cf. IMF 1998). However, the ESAF programme, agreed upon in 1999, did not reflect this criticism.

Only after the G-7 summit in Cologne 1999 linked debt relief under the enhanced *Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)* initiative to poverty reduction, a major shift in the international aid regime occurred. Zambia was among the first group of countries to start with the preparation of an *Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy*, presenting it in July 2000. One reason for this early start might have been the very active civil society in Zambia that campaigned heavily for debt relief. However, that the donor community was willing to take Zambia on board at that early stage was also due to a decision of the Chiluba regime to fulfil an old economic conditionality, the privatisation of the copper mines, in March 2000. Three months later the donors rewarded Chiluba with a consultative group meeting, which, for the first time, was not held in Paris, but in Zambia. Interestingly enough, it was again the economic dimension that counted. Even though Chiluba was preparing another constitutional change to allow him a third presidential term, which caused concern among the donors, this was obviously outweighed by the new privatisation move.

After a short period of annoyance following the elections regarded as unfair, the new Mwanawasa government managed to retrieve donor support quickly. The IMF and the World Bank quickly endorsed the PRSP, prepared with strong civil society participation under Chiluba in 2001 and approved by the new cabinet in March 2002. Only a few weeks later, in July 2002, the donors pledged new aid in an all-time high amount of about 1,3 billion US-\$ for a three-year period (however, only a small share of it was actually disbursed).

Since 2002 nearly all donors explicitly stated that the PRS approach, together with the MDG, will be the overall framework for development cooperation with Zambia for years. The general support of the donor community is reflected in various ways: their presence in the PRS working groups (renamed *Sector Advisory Groups* meanwhile), the decisions in the context of the *Harmonisation in Practice Initiative*, numerous joint statements, and the joint financing of core PRS related reform programmes. Looking at the PRS cycle, the involvement of donors can be described briefly as follows. During the process to prepare the Full-PRSP (in 2001), the donors participated intensively in the PRS working groups. In some groups,

which were seen as of specific importance, like macroeconomics, the number of donors was even as high as all other (governmental and non-governmental) representatives together. After approval by the Zambian cabinet, the boards of IMF and World Bank ‘endorsed’ the PRSP in June 2002 on the basis of a *Joint Staff Assessment* of the Bretton Woods twins that had assessed the strategy positively. Donor participation in PRS implementation is difficult to assess as the implementation process during the period 2002-2004 is regarded as very weak. Nevertheless, joint efforts—to not only improve coordination but to create harmonisation between the donors in the PRS implementation—can be found especially in the context of the *Harmonisation in Practice Initiative* (details follow below). Furthermore, donors offered technical assistance to improve the PRS monitoring system. The PRS review process has been postponed to 2005. But the *Sector Advisory Groups (SAG)* in which donors are quite active started early to prepare this stage. Donors are represented in all of the SAGs, although not as numerous as during the first preparation phase. Instead, a number of donors coordinated the delegation of representatives to the various groups.

The following sections look at donor behaviour in Zambia with regard to the three essentials of the new aid approach identified above. However, to get a more detailed insight, the alignment of four donors (IMF, World Bank, UK, Germany) will be given special attention.⁶

Stakeholder perspective

Starting again with the proclaimed intentions, one finds plenty of new partnership rhetoric in donor papers related to Zambia. The IMF / World Bank *Joint Staff Assessments (JSA)* as the central donor documents in the PRS process serve as good examples. Commenting on the PRSP document itself, the JSA stated in 2002 “the Zambian PRSP has, from the beginning, adopted a participatory approach” involving “representatives from government, NGOs, academia, businessmen, the church, parliamentarians and donors” (IMF / World Bank 2002: para. 6). Two years later, the JSA of the first Government

⁶ The World Bank (as the biggest single donor), the IMF (as the institution with the strongest influence on Zambia during the structural adjustment regime), the British Department for International Development (DFID) and Germany as two of the largest bilateral donors being active in Zambia for many years.

PRS implementation report (GRZ 2004) concludes that “the monitoring and evaluation framework allows and supports the regular participation – at all levels of government – of implementing institutions, civil society organizations, private sector, and cooperating partners in monitoring and evaluating PRSP implementation” – but the necessity for “improving participatory governance” was also emphasised (IMF / World Bank 2004: para 32, 9). In its new *Country Assistance Strategy (CAS)*, the World Bank demonstrates a broad partnership understanding: consultations in the drafting phase of the CAS as well as frequent “formal consultations” during the CAS implementation phase shall “further strengthen partnerships with civil society, private sector, and other stakeholders in Zambia” (World Bank 2004: 38). *Good governance* as precondition for positive developments is mentioned several times in the CAS, interestingly – and for the first time – the World Bank also links *good governance* to improving “participation, democracy and transparency in decision-making” (ibid.: 25). These and similar general statements in bilateral strategies show that the new extended stakeholder perspective has been accurately woven into donor documents.

Examining the practical experience, the picture is mixed. On the one hand, positive real support for extended partnerships can be identified, especially with regard to civil society in Zambia. Donors like the German GTZ and the UK DFID give strong support for organised civil society, notably the CSPR network based in Lusaka (see *Waldenhof* in this volume). Equally important, the dialogue between donors and civil society representatives has been intensified over the last two years. To give examples that would not have been found a few years ago: IMF missions coming to Zambia seek to meet societal representatives frequently to discuss policy issues. Civil society representatives are now invited regularly to address the donors *Consultative Group Meeting*. The World Bank presented the draft of its new CAS in a public stakeholder meeting. These are new developments. But, on the other hand, the quality and extent of partnerships with civil society show a number of shortcomings. Donors concentrate on the organised NGOs in Lusaka; civil society groups from outside the capital are very rarely involved in dialogues. As civil society representatives complain, talks between them and donors still continually take place in an ad hoc manner, often on short notice, based on limited information flows in advance of meetings. So

far no mechanisms have been developed which include community-based self-help groups or other institutions representing the poor themselves. Though World Bank and other donors conducted some *Participatory Poverty Assessments* in the past, this has not been systematically integrated in decision-making processes. In general, there is no institutionalisation of participation. The donors themselves, let alone Government, do not take minimal standards of societal participation systematically into consideration.⁷

Looking at the role of the legislature in aid relationships, more weaknesses in the implementation of a new partnership understanding become obvious. Talking about *country ownership* and *participation* in Sub-Saharan African countries for most donors is concentrated on civil society organisations; leaving parliaments aside (Eberlei / Henn 2003). The PRS process in Zambia is no exception to this rule. Though some individual members of parliament have attended workshops, Parliament as an institution was not involved in the PRS preparation process, nor in other fundamental debates, e.g. on the design of a monitoring and evaluation framework (which is directly linked with the constitutional oversight role of parliament). While the donors underlined their strong desire to include civil society, there has been no such demand regarding parliament. Even those donors who are very vigorous with spreading participatory fundamentals are bypassing the parliament when it comes to their bilateral strategic documents. The example of the newly launched DFID *Country Assistance Plan (CAP)* illustrates this. Although a study commissioned by DFID in Zambia clearly concludes that pro-poor changes in Zambian politics “will come about only if effective pressure can be applied, principally by citizens through (among others) Parliament” (Duncan et al 2003: v), the new CAP does not have a single proposal to support the legislature and, furthermore, did not even include parliamentarians in the preparatory consultations. This ignorance regarding the Zambian parliament can similarly be found in the preparation of other bilaterals’ country strategies, such as the German *Priority Area Strategies*. The World Bank, at least, invited parliamentarians for the first time to a half-day meeting

⁷ The following elements have been discussed as minimal requirements for meaningful societal participation in political processes around poverty reduction: an appropriate legal framework, functioning structures, strengthened capacities and convincing legitimacy (cf. Eberlei 2002, 2005).

during their CAS preparation phase, although several members of parliament, who attended that meeting, expressed a critical view on it (to them it looked like an token exercise).

Nevertheless, international debate about the role of parliaments in PRS processes does seem to be showing some effect on donors in Zambia. In addition to a few general capacity building programmes for the Zambian parliament (e.g. by UNDP), the strengthening of Parliament is now mentioned in a new reform programme in Zambia, the *Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability (PEMFA)* programme (on PEMFA see *Mutesa* in this volume). And, moreover, the World Bank supports for the first time the strengthening of democratic oversight of the budget. It requires that “supplemental appropriations” be approved by Parliament before spending the money (World Bank 2004: 25).

However, and this reduces the value of the aforementioned positive steps, when it comes to politically sensitive issues, donors still negotiate with the executive behind closed doors, leaving the Parliament as well as civil society representatives aside. The negotiations during the *Consultative Group Meetings* do not take place in the presence of parliamentary or civil society representatives (they are invited to join a separate ‘public’ part of CG-meetings only), neither do donors insist on the participation of societal representatives in other negotiations (dealing e.g. with central policy documents like a new PRGF, the PEMFA roadmap, a new country strategy, annual aid plans of donors or other core elements of the donor-country relationship). The important decisions in the aid relationship with Zambia are – despite all the rhetoric and all the mentioned small steps to extend the partnerships – still made by the governments and its leading elites. The most recent overall agreement between the Government of Zambia and the donor community – the *Memorandum of Understanding: Co-ordination and Harmonisation of GRZ/Donor Practices for Aid Effectiveness in Zambia*, approved and signed in April 2004 by the Government and almost all major donors – did not include parliamentary or civil society representatives during its preparation and negotiation, nor does it now include them in the implementation of the agreement, which touches a broad range of issues.

Conclusion on stakeholder perspective: Comparing the new experience with the pre-PRS phase in Zambia but also with the experience of a number of other African countries, it can be

summarised that the inclusion of well-organised civil society forces in Lusaka has been developed and reflects the new stakeholder perspective. However, donor agencies in Zambia still have a blind spot when it comes to the inclusion of legislative institutions. Inclusion of ‘the poor’ and specifically marginalised societal groups like women or smallholder farmers in remote areas is still a theoretical wish, having very little to do with the reality on the ground (see *Elemu* and *Imboela* in this volume).

Operational basis

The issue of a new operational basis in the relationship between Zambia and its donors generates at least two aspects: Does the PRS truly reflect *country ownership*? And, do the donors align their own strategies with the PRS?

The Full-PRSP was drafted in the *Ministry of Finance and Planning*, based on a broad participatory process (Seshamani 2002) and finally approved by the newly elected President and his cabinet in 2002. All this complies with the principle of country ownership. Notwithstanding, there is still a lot of evidence of strong donor influence:

- Donors influenced the ‘participatory process’ directly. All PRS working groups aiming at designing the document included donors. In the macroeconomic group, for example, 6 out of the 13 members were donor representatives.
- Donors imposed their policy guiding principles on the PRS preparation process by linking it with debt relief. To reach the HIPC decision point, the Zambian Government accepted in late 2000 the respective *Decision point document* (IMF / World Bank 2000), which included a number of ‘triggers’ on the way to the completion point and left little room for manoeuvre.
- The PRS had to be “endorsed” by the boards of the IMF and the World Bank in May 2002, which clearly shows who had the final say.

Based on these facts, one cannot assess the Zambian Full-PRSP neither as a fully country-owned document, nor as ‘more of the same’ old donor-driven approach as some NGO publications claim (see for example Situmbeko / Zulu 2004). After at least a decade of absolutely donor-dominated structural adjustment programmes in Zambia, the PRSP reflects a first attempt to elaborate homegrown strategic perspectives, but still under heavy donor influence.

The analysis of the individual donors' strategy alignment with the Zambian PRS supports this mixed picture. The *Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF)* is negotiated between the IMF and a small circle within Government behind closed doors. However, although core elements of the old structural adjustment programmes (like liberalisation and privatisation) are still in place, the new agreement has a stronger focus on poverty-related issues and supports a more active role for the state than in previous agreements.

In contrast to the IMF, the World Bank has derived its new *Country Assistance Strategy (CAS)* explicitly from the PRS (cf. World Bank 2004). In a number of meetings, CAS drafts were discussed before the final version was developed. The new CAS seems to be – not only with regard to the drafting process but also in terms of content – a prototype of a donor strategy in line with a country-owned PRSP. The CAS develops three “strategic priority areas” related to PRS implementation. Taking the PRS goals as given, the CAS formulates strategic objectives and long-term outcomes as well as *CAS Outcome Indicators* as benchmarks. Bank staff members praise this results-based approach as an innovation. Looking behind the curtain of nice and politically correct World Bank wording, this picture has to be modified somewhat. In substance, there has been no change between the World Bank CAS 1999 and the new CAS 2004. The three priority areas, presented as PRS-related in 2004, can be found in the 1999 paper, too. Does this reflect ignorance vis-à-vis the PRS or – an even more interesting question – does the PRS reflect the old Bank priorities (comparable with the unchanged IMF essentials)? From the point of view of a country office staff member, the World Bank priorities are the same, simply because “these are Zambia’s major problems, this has not changed”.

Even more revealing is that the Zambian PRS process does obviously not inspire a stronger World Bank support for the country. On the contrary, the CAS 2004 reflects a quite pessimistic mood, at least compared to 1999. While the CAS 1999 started with the ‘base case scenario’ (one should not forget that Chiluba’s political legitimacy and socio-economic performance was already heavily under question in 1999), the starting point for the CAS 2004 was a ‘low case’ only. Never before did a World Bank CAS show such scepticism regarding the overall political situation: “The poor track record on reforms and its implementation is a manifestation of lack of ownership and political commitment” (World Bank 2004: 12). There

is a wide gap between this strong assertion and the rhetorical link between the Zambian PRSP and the new World Bank CAS. The latter appears to be the result of professional World Bank wording referring to a 'country driven' document while still following the own agenda.

The other major multilateral donors in Zambia put less effort into rhetorical exercises. Neither UNDP nor the European Union have seen the necessity to change their country strategies after the PRS was introduced, as the new document would reflect their already existing individual strategies. Some bilateral donors, among them the UK and Sweden, link their country strategies explicitly to the PRS. According to their own assessment, UK DFID has concentrated more than 90 percent of their work in Zambia towards the PRS (cf. Driscoll / Evans 2004: 24). However, the new DFID *Country Assistance Plan (CAP)* for Zambia reveals that the rationale for the DFID strategy is not the PRS (alone): "Our main contribution to achieving progress towards the MDG will be in addressing *what we believe* are some of the key underlying constraints" (DFID 2004: 13, accentuation W.E.). Following the MDGs is, of course, not necessarily in conflict with the PRS, but still reflects the old perspective of knowing better.

Contrary to DFID and other 'like-minded' bilateral donors, Germany has only an unpublished, internal *Country Concept* for Zambia that is not even discussed with the Government of Zambia. Furthermore, it has three *Priority Area Strategies (PAS)*, defining the bilateral cooperation between Zambia and Germany in the areas of *Water, Decentralised rural development in Southern Province, and Governance, State and Civil Society*. The two latter PAS, finalised in 2004, do show several references to the PRS but the water strategy that was agreed upon in 2002 has only weak links to the PRS. While the aims and specific strategies of the PAS on *Governance, State and Civil Society* do reflect priorities and aspects of the PRS widely, the PAS related to the work in Southern Province is more or less an umbrella document trying to conceptually merge a number of German stand-alone projects in that region. Different from the World Bank CAS, the DFID CAP or other donor strategies, the German PAS does not refer to a certain implementation period, instead reflects general perspectives only. This makes it difficult to link the PAS to a strategic approach like PRS. All in all, the three PAS (which are hardly known within government, let alone outside as they are not publicly accessible) are, first and foremost, German business operational plans, designed parallel to the PRS process.

Concluding on the operational basis between Zambia and the international donor community, it can be confirmed that poverty reduction as an overarching aim is rooted in donor strategies, papers and statements nowadays. The structural features of donor – recipient relationships, however, seem to persist. The policies embedded in the Zambian PRS still reflect medium- to long-term policy perspectives of the donors, though this is not a problem as such. Furthermore, the analysis of individual (post-PRS) donor strategies show minor changes, if at all – which, again, is not automatically a mistake. But both aspects indicate that donor supported developmental policies in Zambia are still defined by the international community, not by the Government, let alone the Zambian society. This finding does reflect the old power relations of ‘donorship’. However, the unwillingness or inability of the Zambian Government to use the new space given by the principle of ownership might also be a strong factor in favour of ‘business as usual’. Putting it differently: The new PRS principles opened the door for changing the operational basis of development cooperation, but the Government seems to be extremely reluctant to use it.⁸

Aid modalities

The third aspect of the new approach to aid refers to the modalities, the aid instruments and *modi operandi* of donors and – crucially – their harmonisation. Zambia is one of the pilot countries of the donor harmonisation initiative based on the “Rome Declaration on Harmonization”, which was approved by all bilateral donors belonging to the OECD Development Assistance Committee as well as some multilateral donors in February 2003 in Rome. In Zambia the efforts to harmonise donor work started a few years ago. The seven so-called ‘like-minded’ countries (Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, UK) decided, in a meeting in Helsinki in September 2002, to harmonise their bilateral development cooperation with Zambia more efficiently. After some months of negotiations with the Zambian Government, both sides agreed upon a *Framework for Harmonisation in Practice (HIP) Action*. This initiative of the seven bilateral donors received a rather reluctant

⁸ Bwalya / Rakner et al (based on fieldwork in late 2002) prognosticate that a “lack of ‘ownership’ by the political class may prove to be a serious obstacle in terms of the implementation of this important document“ (2004: 27, 24).

response from other donors as those felt excluded from the initiative. Therefore, a new effort was started in 2003 to create a platform for donor harmonisation. This led to the signing of a *Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)* on April 1, 2004 (cf. GRZ / Donor MoU 2004). The MoU was signed by the Government of Zambia, by the above-mentioned 'like-minded' donors as well as by Germany, Japan, France and Canada. It is also important that the World Bank signed this document (as the biggest donor in Zambia) as well as the head of the UN mission in Zambia. Regardless, a few important donors did not sign: USAID, the EU, the IMF and the AfDB.

This MoU is clearly focused on the harmonised support for PRS implementation as the two first mentioned principles of the MoU show: "Delivery of development assistance in accordance with Zambia's needs and priorities as outlined in her PRSP." And: "Alignment with GRZ systems such as national budget cycles, financial systems and PRSP / MDGs monitoring processes, where these provide reasonable assurance that co-operation resources are used for agreed purposes" (ibid.: 2). Since signing of the MoU, more than 20 working groups try to translate good ideas into practice. Some practical steps – like a joint mission calendar, the intensified exchange of information between donors or a few other new activities – are mentioned as examples of success. However, comparing these "reforms" of the donor agencies to the drastic reform agenda which a poor country like Zambia has struggled with for many years already, one wonders if these small and long overdue changes in donor practices should really be applauded. And it remains to be seen if the few challenging and meaningful new ideas get a chance to take off. The approach to formulate a *Joint Donor Assistance Strategy* must be seen as one of the crucial tests: Some donors, especially the Nordics, are optimistic that this joint donor document will be in place shortly after the approval of the revised PRS in 2006. But from today's point of view, it seems highly unlikely that the World Bank, the IMF, the UK DFID or Germany could accept a joint donor strategy replacing their CAS, PRGF, CAP or PAS in the near future.

Regarding the group of four donors highlighted above, the following can be said. The British DFID was actively involved in the preparation of the MoU. It is one of the new CAP objectives "to improve aid management and effectiveness in Zambia". According to DFID's assessment, "present aid delivery is in contrast to the ideal of a framework of well-aligned and harmonised multi-donor assistance

to the PRSP – an ideal best put into practice by providing forms of budget support” (DFID 2004: 15). *Budget Aid* is the core instrument laid out in DFID’s perspective on harmonisation. The fact that more than 40 international (state-based) donors fund more than 1000 projects or small programmes in Zambia, often without any coordination among each other and frequently even hindering each other, puts, in DFID’s view, a heavy burden on the Zambian Government and contradicts poverty reduction efforts. In May 2004, DFID proposed a “joint bilateral donor multi-year Poverty Reduction Grant Support Programme”. After the EU started disbursing budget aid to Zambia in mid-2004, DFID among a few other bilateral donors (Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands) is preparing to grant budget aid also from 2005 onwards.

Germany was not an active player in the development of the *Harmonisation in Practice* initiative and, therefore is seen as a ‘non-HIP donor’ (this term was used by some donors in 2002 / 2003). However, from mid-2003 onwards, the German embassy (and partly also the GTZ) participated in some HIP meetings. After having signed the MoU, GTZ has assumed specific responsibilities on behalf of the HIP group in the area of PRS monitoring and support for civil society; however, this is strongly limited by scarce staff resources (the GTZ funds for Zambia have been curtailed dramatically in 2004 and 2005). The German approach is still strongly linked to traditional project aid. There are no signs that Germany would be willing to shift to budget aid for Zambia in the near future.

The World Bank is another reluctant player in the harmonisation field. While the Bank’s headquarters is obviously more in favour of harmonisation initiatives, the Zambian country office was very sceptical. Representatives of the country office assessed the HIP process in interviews as primarily donor driven, lacking the necessary ownership on the side of the Zambian Government. Nevertheless, the World Bank signed the MoU and has participated in the HIP discussions since then. The Bank is prepared to start with budget aid in terms of a *Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC)* from 2006 onwards if the Zambian Government fulfils certain requirements. Meanwhile, the World Bank remains engaged in sector-wide approaches as well as through specific projects and programmes. Most of them are linked with Government structures but channel the financial funds outside the regular budget lines in the traditional manner. The IMF participated in the April 2004 meeting as an

observer only and did not sign the MoU. Officially, this was explained by the specific role of the IMF, which doesn't see itself as a donor.

These few examples show that the donor community in Zambia is far from achieving a unified and harmonised basis. Some donors like USAID operate strictly outside the idea of new aid modalities. Some donors, e.g. Germany, support the harmonisation agenda on the one hand, but are still stuck in terms of their own institutional preconditions (the difficult German institutional landscape and the distinction between financial aid and technical assistance obstruct aid effectiveness). Another group of donors, lead by DFID, operates in the forefront of harmonisation. But even these donors play their own games, if it serves their purpose. DFID provides a bad example with the recently launched *Blair Commission for Africa* that initiated absolutely unilaterally driven, parallel and costly participatory exercises (including a two day national stakeholders forum in Lusaka in December 2004) to produce input for a British EU- and G8-Initiative.⁹ The Zambian Government supported this unilateral stand-alone initiative, but possibly for less honest motives. According to a well-informed observer, this support was based on the hope of some upper echelons in Government of getting an invitation to the following G8 summit in the UK.

The inconsistencies within the donor community seem to have a number of reasons, among them the following:

- Firstly, the overall objectives of donors are differing. Most important, the extent to which a donor is committed to the *Millennium Development Goals* varies strongly. While strong supporters (e.g. DFID and the 'like-minded-group') design their country strategies in light of the MDGs and view the PRS as the crucial vehicle to get there, the reluctant donors (like the World Bank and the IMF) are still strongly influenced by their own policy agenda, and some donors (like USAID) are not linked to the MDG- and PRS-idea at all.

- Secondly, the variation starts *within* the agencies. Two examples: There is a clear difference between the headquarters on the one hand

⁹ The three demands coming out of this consultative forum – fairer terms of trade, debt cancellation and significant more aid – have been repeatedly discussed since the 1970's. For a critical review of the 'Blair Commission' in a Zambian newspaper, see *The Post*, 27 February 2005, p.6-7

(debating at the global level about aid principles) and the country offices on the other hand (struggling with the concrete country situation). The ‘success indicators’ of the latter are often tied to the smooth implementation of aid programmes and projects (measured in terms of disbursements or donor-defined indicators). Furthermore, there are ongoing debates in almost all donor agencies between different fractions, e.g. in the World Bank between the supporters of the neo-liberal paradigm and those in favour of the new poverty oriented approach.

- Thirdly, some donors have had a debate about aid effectiveness already years ago (e.g. DFID), often pushed by strong criticism within their countries, while this debate has never been very strong in other donor countries (e.g. Germany or Japan).

- Fourthly, some donors (e.g. the ‘Nordics’) have adjusted their institutional settings in favour of new aid approaches already years ago (e.g. by overcoming the gap between financial and technical assistance or by transferring decision-making power into their country offices), while other donors are still stuck within their traditional institutional settings and headquarter-dominated decisions (e.g. Germany).

Summarising this, the following becomes apparent: The differences between the more than 40 bi- and multilateral donors in Zambia in terms of commitment to renewed aid modalities are still significant. Furthermore, it has to be stated, “that progress on implementation of various actions was less than satisfactory” (as one conclusion of a first internal review of the *Harmonisation in Practice Initiative* puts it politely, GRZ 2005: 3). Finally, the international donor community is far from a unified position, despite all new aid rhetoric.

4. Do donor politics matter?

The PRS approach has introduced a new quality of interactions between national and international actors in the area of poverty reduction. In the light of the *Zambian case*, there seems to be, however, a twofold implementation problem. The donor community is not implementing the new principles sufficiently (as has been shown in the previous chapter), and, moreover, the *Zambian Government* reveals dramatic weaknesses in the implementation of the *Poverty Reduction Strategy* (as several contributions in this

volume prove). This twofold implementation problem results in persisting poverty levels and stabilised neopatrimonial behaviour.

As long as the donors do not follow their own new aid principles that are based upon lessons learned in the 1980s and 1990s, business as usual leads to high short-term influence (at the donor-driven surface), but without any medium-term relevance in terms of real changes in the lives of the poor. The analysis of the three essentials of the new approach has demonstrated that the *Zambian relationship* to its donors shows significant changes in all the three major categories since the PRS approach came into being: stakeholder perspective, operational basis, aid modalities. But in terms of quality and depth, these developments are lurching somehow between the traditional aid system and the new approach. The *operational basis* of many donors is still driven by own interests and policy agendas, not or only half-heartedly by the *Zambian PRS*. The harmonisation of *aid modalities* is – almost six years after the introduction of the PRS approach – still in its infancy (and the failure to agree upon harmonisation commitments during a high-level donor meeting in early March 2005 underlines that this is not a problem in Zambia alone). Much has to be done on these two categories of development cooperation.

But: The key to a renewed aid relationship aiming at meaningful poverty reduction is to take the new *stakeholder perspective* more seriously and to strengthen the empowerment of reform forces within the country. “Many entry points do exist for strengthening the forces that can support pro-poor change in Zambia“, is the optimistic perspective of a recent study. But: “This paper suggests that the necessary changes will come about only if effective pressure can be applied, principally by citizens through (among others) Parliament, the media, or civil society organisations” (Duncan et al 2003: vi, v). In principle, this approach is part of the PRS idea as the already mentioned DAC guidelines state precisely: “Empowerment of the poor through participatory democracy and human rights is central to reducing poverty” (OECD 2001: 86). However, this view has not been put consequently enough into practice in Zambia.

Empowering societal stakeholders does not mean weakening the state. On the contrary – it has been one of the most important lessons from the 1980s and 1990s that a strong state is needed as the central player in development. However, the state has to be freed from the influence of those parts of the political elite following their personal interests only. “What is needed are state-society linkages that

'embed' the state." (van de Walle 2003: 23) But the danger is real that "donor pressure for democratization is likely to remain at the level of effecting minimal political reform that leaves intact existing power structures and relations" (Cheru 2002: 43).

Do donor politics matter in terms of poverty reduction? They might. But there is little evidence that they do as long as donor support to the empowerment of the poor and their representatives in parliaments and civil societies is treated as a matter of marginal importance. Even worse: As long as donors are fuelling and thereby stabilising neopatrimonial systems, genuine developments towards democratic societies ruled by elites in the interests of the poor majorities will hardly occur. Robert Bates argued that such a meaningful transition would only become possible when African rulers have to negotiate with their own citizens for the resources to govern.¹⁰ But this "silent revolution", this "democratisation from below" (Cheru 2002: 45) has not yet taken place. The conclusion for donors is as follows: Supporting poverty reduction requires the consequent empowerment of the poor and their representatives in order to dis-empower neopatrimonial elites. The Zambian case does not demonstrate that this has been understood sufficiently so far.

References

- Booth, David (ed.) (2003): *Fighting Poverty in Africa: Are PRSPs making a difference?* London: Overseas Development Institute
- Burnside, Craig/Dollar, David (1998): *Aid, the Incentive Regime, and Poverty Reduction*. Washington D.C.: The World Bank
- Bwalya, Edgar/Rakner, Lise et al (2004): *Poverty reduction strategy processes in Malawi and Zambia (= CMI, R 2004: 8)*. Bergen / Norway: Christian Michelsen Institute. Internet:
(www.cmi.no/publications/2004/rep/r2004-8.pdf - access 23.09.2005)
- Chabal, Patrick/Daloz, Jean-Pascal (1999): *Africa Works. Disorder as Political Instrument*. Oxford/Bloomington: Currey

¹⁰ Bates quoted in Joseph 1998: 12. Chabal / Daloz formulate a similar argument: "Only when ordinary African men and women have cause to reject the logic of personalized politics, seriously to question the legitimacy of the present political instrumentalization of disorder and to struggle for new forms of political accountability, will meaningful change occur" (1999: 162).

- Cheru, Fantu (2002): African Renaissance. Roadmaps to the Challenge of Globalization. London / New York: Zed Books
- Devarajan, Shantayanan/Dollar, David R./Holmgren, Torgny (2001): Aid & Reform in Africa. Lessons from ten case studies. Washington D.C.: The World Bank
- DFID (2004): Zambia: Country Assistance Plan. 2004/05-2006/07. Lusaka / London: DFID
- Duncan, Alex/Macmillan, Hugh/Simutanyi, Neo (2003): Zambia. Drivers of pro-poor change: an overview. Oxford: Paper commissioned by DFID
- Driscoll, Ruth/Evans, Alison: The PRSP Process and DFID Engagement. Survey of Progress 2003. London: Overseas Development Institute
- Eberlei, Walter (2002): Elementary Standards of Participation in National PRSP Processes (= Schriftenreihe Gerechtigkeit und Frieden der Deutschen Kommission Justitia et Pax, ARB 96). Bonn: Deutsche Kommission Justitia et Pax
- Eberlei, Walter (2005): Fighting Poverty without Empowering the Poor? Bonn / Berlin: VENRO / GKKE. Download, see: www.prsp-watch.de
- Eberlei, Walter / Siebold, Thomas (2002): Armutsbekämpfung in Afrika: Neue Ansätze oder alte Konzepte? (= INEF-Report 64). Duisburg: Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden (INEF)
- Eberlei, Walter / Henn, Heike (2003): Parliaments in Sub-Saharan Africa: actors in poverty reduction? Study commissioned by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ). Eschborn: GTZ
- Eberlei, Walter/Führmann, Bettina (2004): Fighting Poverty and Corruption. Integrating the Fight Against Corruption into the PRS process - Analysis and Recommendations for Development Cooperation. Eschborn: GTZ
- Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ) (1999): Letter of Intent and Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies. 10.03.1999. Lusaka (www.imf.org/external/np/loi/1999/031199.htm - access 23.09.2005)
- Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ) (2002): Zambia Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2002-2004. Lusaka: Ministry of Finance and National Planning
- Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ) (2004): First PRSP Implementation Progress Report. January 2002 - June 2003. Lusaka: Ministry of Finance and National Planning
- Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ) (2005): Review and Road Map for Implementing the Harmonisation and Coordination Memorandum of Understanding. Lusaka: Ministry of Finance and National Planning (unpublished document)
- Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ) / Donor (2004): Memorandum of Understanding. Co-ordination and Harmonisation of

- GRZ/Donor Practices for Aid Effectiveness in Zambia. Lusaka: Ministry of Finance and National Planning
- HIP (2003) / HIP Reference Group I / Aid Policy Development: Documentation for First Meeting, 24. September 2003. Prepared by Oliver S. Saasa. Unpublished.
- IMF (1998): External Evaluation of the ESAF, Report by a Group of Independent Experts. Washington DC.: IMF
(www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/extev/index.HTM - access 23.09.2005)
- IMF / World Bank (2000): Decision Point Document for the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. Prepared by the Staffs of the IMF and IDA. Washington D.C.: IMF / World Bank
(www.imf.org/external/np/hipc/2000/zmb/zambia.pdf -access 23.09.2005)
- IMF / World Bank (2002): Zambia Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper – Joint Staff Assessment. Washington D.C.: IMF / World Bank
- IMF / World Bank (2004): Zambia Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Progress Report – Joint Staff Assessment. Washington D.C.: IMF / World Bank
- Joseph, Richard (1998): Africa, 1990-1997: From Abertura to Closure, in: *Journal of Democracy*, Vol 9, No 2, April 1998, pp. 3-17
- Kufekisa, Mulima Akapelwa (2001): From Structural Adjustment Programme to Poverty Reduction, in: *Economic Justice Bulletin*, 2001, No 28, pp. 10-14
- McCollim, Elena (2001): What Good Can Debt Relief and PRSP Do? The Case of Zambia. (= Bread for the World Institute, Debt & Development Dossier # 5). Washington D.C.: Bread for the World Institute
- Mkandawire, Thandika (1999): Crisis Management and the Making of “Choiceless Democracies”, in: Joseph, R. (ed.): *State, Conflict and Democracy in Africa*. Boulder / London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp.119-136
- ____ (2004): Good Governance. The itinerary of an idea, in: *Development & Cooperation*, No. 10, (http://www.inwent.org/E+Z/content/archive-eng/10-2004/tribune_art1.html - access 23.09.2005)
- Meys, Peter (1995): *Zambia in der 3. Republik: Demokratische Transition und politische Kontinuität. Analyse und Dokumentation*. Hamburg: Institut für Afrika-Kunde
- OECD (2001): *The DAC Guidelines on Poverty Reduction*. Paris: OECD
- OECD (2003): *Harmonising Donor Practices for Effective Aid Delivery. Good Practice Papers. A DAC Reference Document*. Paris: OECD
- Rakner, Lise (2003): *Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991-2001*. Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute

- Rome Declaration on Harmonization (2003), approved during Rome High Level Forums of bi- and multilateral donors, 25. February 2003, Web: www.aidharmonization.org
- Seshamani, Venkatesh (2002): The PRSP Process in Zambia. Paper presented at the 2nd meeting of the African Learning Group on the PRSP. Brussels 18-21 Nov 2002, (www.uneca.org/prsp/docs/prsp_final/zambia.pdf - access 23.09.2005)
- Situmbeko, Lishala C. / Zulu, Jack Jones (2004): Zambia: Condemned to debt. How the IMF and World Bank have undermined development. London: World Development Movement
- Tetzlaff, Rainer (2003): Good Governance und Neopatrimonialismus in Afrika südlich der Sahara - ein Widerspruch? (Good Governance and Neopatrimonialism in Sub-Saharan Africa - a contradiction?), in: Nord-Süd aktuell, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp.478-486
- van de Walle, Nicolas (2001): African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- ____ (2003): Introduction: The State and African Development, in: van de Walle, Nicolas et al. (eds.): Beyond Structural Adjustment. The Institutional Context of African Development. New York et al.: Palgrave/Macmillan, pp. 1-33
- World Bank (1989): From Crisis to Sustainable Growth. Washington D.C.: The World Bank
- World Bank OED (Operations Evaluations Department) (2002): Zambia. Country Assistance Evaluation. Washington D.C.: The World Bank
- World Bank (2004): Country Assistance Strategy for the Republic of Zambia. Washington D.C.: The World Bank

Eberlei, Walter (2005): Donor Politics in Zambia: Promoting Poverty Reduction or Fuelling Neopatrimonialism. In: Eberlei, Walter / Meyns, Peter / Mutesa, Fred (eds.) (2005): Poverty Reduction in a Political Trap? The PRS Process and Neopatrimonialism in Zambia. Lusaka: UNZA Press, 89-115