

Achieving Poverty Reduction - Can Zambia's Political System Deliver the Goods?

by Peter Meyns

1. Introduction

Since the beginning of the year 2000, Zambia has been focusing its development efforts on poverty reduction. The Interim-PRSP was adopted in that year and two years later the “Zambia Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2002 – 2004” was launched. This new development terminology resulted from the so-called HIPC Initiative, adopted at the G-7 Cologne Summit in 1999, whereby the international community would offer those “heavily indebted poor countries” which embarked on poverty reduction programmes extensive debt relief.

Needless to say, the current PRS approach is not Zambia's first development effort, it is the most recent of numerous efforts which basically have been ongoing since the country's independence in 1964. While the initial years of post-independent development are generally regarded as the golden years, the years since about 1974, in other words the past 30 years, have seen a process of more or less “permanent crisis” (van de Walle 2001). It is well known that in Zambia's case this decay has been closely related to the vagaries of the world copper market. But it is, today, equally well established that the politics pursued and the policies adopted in the Zambian political system must take their share of the blame.

This contribution will focus on the political system in Zambia, its features and their implications for poverty reduction. The reference to the country's trajectory since independence is pertinent in the sense that by and large Zambia, particularly when compared to some of its neighbours, has experienced a high degree of political stability throughout the past 40 years. The country has had only three presidents, each of whom came to power peacefully and by constitutional means. It is true that following the changes of

government in 1991 and 2001 each new head of state blamed his predecessor for the country's problems, be it autocratic rule or corruption, implying that they would change things radically. Nevertheless, in terms of social and economic conditions there does seem to be a high degree of continuity in Zambia's development, enough, it would seem, to ask whether the saying "the more things change, the more they remain the same" applies in this case.

This question relates back to Zambia's current poverty reduction policy and the aim of creating an enabling environment conducive to successful poverty reduction. Creating an enabling environment has frequently been referred to in the context of neo-liberal policies implying, in particular, the strengthening of the private sector of the economy. During the Chiluba presidency it came to be referred to ironically as the way to self-enrichment. Here, I refer to enabling environment in a broader systemic sense which includes economic as well as political dimensions (CSPR 2002) and focuses principally on political conditions of development. In other words, can Zambia's political system deliver the goods, i.e. provide the conditions needed to achieve poverty reduction

2. Development and Democracy - the ongoing debate

When African countries embarked upon their second democratisation in the late 1980s and early 1990s it was widely believed that this transition would also unblock their social and economic development processes, which in many cases had come to a standstill under autocratic one-party rule. This belief, as we know today, did not hold good. Zambia is a case in point where, notwithstanding the economic policy turnaround and the adoption of neo-liberal shock therapy following the re-establishment of multipartyism in the 3rd Republic and the change of government, the economic doldrums continued. Multipartyism and open markets, it has become clear, do not necessarily lead to developmental progress. The debate on the relationship between development and democracy is an ongoing one.

The prevailing view in post-colonial Africa was that the prime task of the new states after independence was to pursue economic and social development. Competition between rival parties was seen as a potential threat to focusing all national forces principally on developmental aims. Putting economic development first was in line

with modernisation theory which, to use S.M. Lipset's classic assertion, argued that "(t)he more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chance that it will sustain democracy." (Lipset 1981 (1960): 31) Of course, leaders of Africa's new nations saw the one-party states which they installed in their countries as embodiments of African democracy. Kaunda's description of Zambia's political system in the 2nd Republic as "one-party participatory democracy" is a reflection of this understanding. What is noteworthy, however, is that the "undisputed authority" of the leader was seen as a reflection of the Africanness of the system as well as a necessary requirement of economic and social development. In general development discourse at the time it was not unusual to refer to "development dictatorships" (Illy et al. 1980) as inevitable transitional phenomena in Third World developing countries.

Disenchantment with such statist approaches to post-colonial development set in during the 1980s when economic conditions had deteriorated badly and debt problems reached crisis dimensions forcing numerous countries to embark on structural adjustment programmes in order to receive new donor credits. Issa Shivji summed up the outcome of statist development ideology and practice bluntly, when he said:

"The present crisis has more or less blown the lid off the ideology of developmentalism. While no fundamental development has taken place over the last two decades, it is also dawning on the masses that meanwhile they have lost their political freedom." (Shivji 1987/88: 9)

The experiences of the first two decades of post-colonial development led to renewed debate about the relationship between development and democracy. One view put forward was that "the deterioration in socio-economic conditions" is closely linked to "the lack of democracy in African politics" (Anyang Nyong'o 1988a: 72). This turns the earlier rationale around. Anyang Nyong'o sees no scope in Africa for "benevolent dictators" or "nation-building emperors" (as say in Japan under the Meiji Restoration) as champions of development (1988b: 86). The highly personalised style of rule which came to characterise African one-party states, in his view, forecloses this path to development. Democratic rule, on the other hand, would introduce the much-needed accountability of leaders and decision-makers (the lack of which encourages the misuse of public

resources to the detriment of developmental goals) and also enhance the stability of the political system.

This view was challenged by another prominent African social scientist who criticised what he saw as an “instrumentalist view of democracy” (Mkandawire 1988: 80), defining the value of democracy in terms of its contribution to development. Mkandawire disputes the view that democracy will, in every case, lead to development and also that there are not also other paths to development, guided by more authoritarian forms of political rule. More fundamentally, he argues that establishing democratic rule should not be tied to the - uncertain outcome - of developmental impact, it should be looked upon principally as “an object of value in itself” which provides African populations with the political rights to participate in shaping the future of their countries - and, in the event, hopefully also promoting economic and social development, particularly such development focused on equity and social justice (Mkandawire 1988: 82).

The debate on the relationship between development and democracy remains quite open after these exchanges. Attempts to test empirically whether development is a condition for, or an outcome of, democracy have not provided any conclusive answers (Mair 1995). It seems justified, therefore, to assert that “there is no necessary relationship between democracy and development” (Leftwich 2000: 133). The view Leftwich submits is that “it has *not* been regime type but the kind and character of the *state* and its associated politics that has been decisive in influencing developmental performance.” (ibid.) Politics, in this perspective, becomes “crucial for both understanding and promoting development.” (ibid.: 4)

Leftwich does not exclude the possibility of democracy being conducive to development, but he does suggest that they are not easily compatible. This is because democratic politics is characterised by accommodation and compromise and therefore needs to be “conservative and incremental in the change it brings about”, while development politics to be successful will more often than not have to challenge established economic interests and therefore adopt a more radical approach to change (Leftwich 2000: 150). He is not questioning the desirability of democracy but pointing out that development is not causally linked to democracy. As our interest is focused on the developmental aim of poverty reduction we need to take a closer look at the political conditions favourable to such development.

3. Political Conditions for Development (I) - a state-centred approach

While post-colonial economic nationalism stressed the crucial developmental role of the state and neo-liberal ideology advocated the strengthening of market forces and the reduction of state intervention, subsequent analysis has come out in favour of “bringing the state back in” (Evans et al. 1985). The intention obviously is not to go back to square one and repeat the earlier mistakes all over again, but to acknowledge the important role the state continues to play under changed internal and external circumstances, rather than throwing the baby out with the bath water. The problem is how to avoid the deficiencies of post-colonial statism as well as the pitfalls of neo-liberal adjustment policies in the process of creating a developmental state.

Leftwich is a proponent of a state endowed with relative autonomy in the sense put forward by Poulantzas. This view argues that while deriving its power and legitimacy from those political and social forces (and interests) which brought a certain government into office and gave it executive authority, the state as the agency responsible for the welfare of society as a whole requires and is endowed with relative autonomy. Putting other aspects of development, such as political institutions and the public service, into context he argues that the role of the state is of central importance, saying “no sophisticated institutional innovations nor the best-trained or best-motivated public service will be able to withstand the withering effects of corruption or resist the developmentally enervating pulls of special or favoured interests if the politics, autonomy and authority of the state do not sustain and protect them.” (Leftwich 2000: 124)

Much depends, of course, on how the state exercises its autonomy and authority. Van de Walle identifies three factors which strongly determine the functioning of African states, i.e. clientelism, low state capacity and the ideological preference of decision makers (van de Walle 2001: 50). He sees the clientelist giving and receiving of favours as crucially determining the state in many African countries. The main thrust of his argument is worth citing at length:

“Under this general rubric of clientelism can be placed a wide variety of practices involving the giving and receiving of favors, almost invariably based on corruption. Clientelism can be

associated with corruption simply because the former relies on privileged access to public resources and some kind of conflict of interest. Although different terminologies have been adopted to characterize political systems in which clientelism is endemic, the most broadly accepted and perhaps most useful from a comparative perspective is the Weberian influenced notion of neopatrimonialism. The term captures the thesis that most African states are hybrid regimes, in which patrimonial practices coexist with modern bureaucracy. Outwardly the state has all the trappings of a Weberian rational-legal system, with a clear distinction between the public and the private realm, with written laws and a constitutional order. However, this official order is constantly subverted by a patrimonial logic, in which officeholders almost systematically appropriate public resources for their own uses and political authority is largely based on clientelistic practices, including patronage, various forms of rent-seeking, and prebendalism. These regimes are highly presidential, in the sense that power is centralized around a single individual, with ultimate control over most clientelist networks. The president personally exerts discretionary power over a big share of the state's resources." (ibid.: 51-52)

The neopatrimonial state is characterised institutionally by the combination of bureaucratic and personalised traits, with the latter carrying greater weight and defining what Medard described as the core feature of neopatrimonialism, i.e. "the privatization of public affairs" (Medard 1982: 185). Such political conditions, it is widely agreed, are not conducive to development, particularly not to poverty reduction, though, as van de Walle points out, they may well be compatible with political stability as long as the political elite benefits from the system.

The answer to states which fail to promote development is not to sideline the state altogether. Seen in a comparative historical perspective, beginning with the ideas of Friedrich List in Germany in the 19th century, successful development, particularly late development seeking its way in the face of more advanced and competitive nations in the world, has always necessitated a strong state in Myrdal's sense (Myrdal 1971), which has the autonomy and the capacity to promote development.

Leftwich has attempted to outline core features of such a developmental state. First and foremost, he asserts, developmental states have been led by “determined developmental elites”, which, while possibly not completely beyond corruption themselves, “have not manifested the corrupt and developmentally corrosive patrimonialism of non-developmental states” such as say Mobutu’s Zaire (Leftwich 2000: 160-161). These elites, he adds, in their responsibility over state institutions have achieved “relative autonomy” which allows them to pursue development aims in the national interest, while at the same time interacting with all relevant social forces in the country rather than being dependent on particular sectional groups. A further feature, which the development orientation of the political elites and their relative autonomy help to shape and which is needed to achieve their aims, are “very powerful, professional, highly competent, insulated and career-based bureaucracies with authority to direct and manage the broad shape of economic and social development.” (ibid.: 162) The ideal-type bureaucracy Max Weber had in mind clearly resonates from these words. Turning to the non-state realm of society Leftwich, perhaps not entirely surprisingly given the importance he attaches to the role of the state, says that the developmental state tends to go along with weak institutions of civil society. Another feature is that the developmental state generally acquires its authority and relative autonomy at a time before economic interests have become well established in the national market, thereby enhancing the scope of its interventions to steer private capital in directions in line with national development aims (ibid.: 165). Finally, Leftwich argues, though developmental states, like say Singapore, may be rigid in the application of rules and intolerant of opposition they tend to maintain legitimacy on the basis of their favourable socio-economic performance. Whether a state with these features does actually emerge, Leftwich concludes, depends on the politics in each country, “the particular outcome will depend on the constellation of political forces within the society - and beyond it.” (ibid.: 169)

It is fairly apparent that the comparative experiences of developmental states which have strongly influenced Leftwich’s model are those of East Asian newly industrialising countries. However, he does also refer to successful African cases, i.e. Botswana and Mauritius. These two cases raise the issue of democracy again. Developmental states, the evidence suggests, can

be democratic or non-democratic. Against the background of the incompatibilities between democracy and development mentioned above, Leftwich suggests that certain types of democratic regime are more likely to produce developmental states than others. Dominant-party states (like Botswana) and, to a lesser degree, coalitional or consociational states (like Mauritius) are, he argues, likely to be developmental states, while class-compromise and alternating-party states are more likely to be non-developmental states (Leftwich 2000: 176).

A brief look at Botswana's post-independence experience gives weight to the validity of Leftwich's model. In his review of Botswana's developmental success, Holm stresses the leading role of an autonomous bureaucratic state in which bureaucratic (Weberian) norms are pervasive and the civil service has been protected from undue political interference by the country's presidents (Holm 1996: 97, 99, 100). Committed to the development of the country this "educated mandarin class", as Holm calls it (1996: 103), has engineered impressive economic growth advances which have given the state considerable legitimacy (109-110). Democratic structures have been limited in their influence on the state and civil society has been restrained in its involvement *inter alia* by the nature of traditional Tswana political culture. In sum, Holm does not see democracy and development as being necessarily in contradiction with each other, but he does see merit in Botswana's path "where a committed developmental political elite promotes development, and democracy emerges gradually as a result of the interaction of development and local traditions." (1996: 111)

4. Political Conditions for Development (II) - state-society relations

As with any 'model' the problem with Leftwich's model of the developmental state is that it proposes one type of solution for a large number of different cases. For those countries unable to create the conditions postulated by his model the prospects for development look dim. "(I)t seems unlikely", he argues, "that it is possible in the modern world for any society to make a speedy and successful transition from poverty without a state that in some respects corresponds to this model of a developmental state" (Leftwich 2000: 169).

It is useful to recall here that Chalmers Johnson, whom Leftwich also acknowledges as the academic who introduced the term “developmental state” in his study on “MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy 1925-1975” (1982), was reluctant to elevate his study of the economic history of industrial development in Japan to the level of an experience which could be generalised and did not plan to include a final chapter to that effect in his book. It was the editor of the publishing house who insisted he should add a final chapter entitled “A Japanese Model?” (Johnson 1999: 39-43). While Johnson does see Japan’s capitalist development state as distinct from socialist command economies as well as *laissez-faire* capitalism and recognises that several Asian states have emulated its “use of market mechanisms for developmental purposes”, he insists that “(n)one of the Asian cases is a clone of the Japanese experience.” (1999: 41) While he does today accept that the East Asian experiences of the developmental state are generalisable (as well as being particular), he still maintains “that it is hard to abstract a ‘model’ from historical reality” and cautions against overgeneralisations (1999: 42-43). In short, Johnson puts much stress on the need to take into consideration the historical point of departure given in each country endeavouring to chart a developmental path.

Leftwich also, as cited above, points to the constellation of political forces which will determine the outcome of development efforts in each country. The parameters required according to his model to achieve speedy and successful development may, however, not be prevalent very often in the African context.

The specificity of Leftwich’s approach is that in terms of the classical debate in political theory on the relationship between state and civil society (Keane 1988) he argues strongly in favour of the state (and its role in promoting development). If the state happens to be part of the problem (rather than the principal answer to the demands of development), countervailing forces will need to play a more prominent role. These may emerge from within the state itself which is not likely to be monolithic but can bring forth divergent political tendencies, particularly in times of crisis and contradiction. Their emergence, however, will be closely related to a more balanced understanding of state-society relations, based on the premise that the state cannot in every instance be trusted with unchallenged authority and that forces in civil society have the duty to exercise vigilance and control to ensure that the state performs its task in the public good.

Looking at conditions for development in Africa, these considerations have to be taken seriously. Against the background of widespread economic, social and political problems discussions abound which refer to the changing focus on the role of the state in the course of post-colonial development. Doornbos identifies “the prime-mover state meant to engineer development, and the obstacle state actually obstructing its own ambitions” as two opposite positions adopted over time and adds the observation that in either case the state is perceived as central (Doornbos 1990: 186-187). Mkandawire refers to the changing perception of the state, strongly influenced by the International Finance Institutions, once seen as “the cornerstone of development” now becoming “the millstone around otherwise efficient markets” (Mkandawire 2001: 293).

The loss of confidence in the capacity of the state to effectively promote development is tied in with its characterisation as a neopatrimonial state. Anyang Nyong'o's assertion, cited above, that he sees no scope in Africa for “benevolent dictators” as champions of development is premised on the prevalence of highly personalised, neopatrimonial rule in African countries (1988b). Botswana, in this view, would be an exceptional case. And Holm's advice that African countries should make the exception the rule and adopt this path to development (1996: 111) is likely to leave many of them by the wayside. The search for alternative paths to development in Anyang Nyong'o's perspective lies in state-society relations less one-sidedly focused on the state.

Mkandawire (2001), while also arguing in favour of democratic rule, takes issue with the view that African countries are incapable of bringing forth developmental states. He cautions against overgeneralising in a negative sense about African countries. Neopatrimonialism, he argues, can be combined with various policies, including developmental ones. Features ascribed to neopatrimonialism, such as corruption or clientelism, on the other hand, are not unknown to successful Asian developmental states (Mkandawire 2001: 299). The phenomenon of rent-seeking, also used to characterise the developmental failings of the African state, Mkandawire contends, occurs in developmental states as well. Its effect need not lead to the disappearance of funds into obscure private channels, he argues, but may also contribute to productive investment and economic growth (2001: 300-301).

Mkandawire rightly stresses the need for a differentiated analysis of African development trajectories. However, in refuting the view that Africa cannot produce developmental states, he has perhaps overstated his case. The Japanese model of a developmental state, apart from depending on a highly qualified, development-oriented and autonomous state bureaucracy, was based on the closest possible liaison between state and market, “conjoining private ownership with state guidance”, in Woo-Cumings’s words (1999: 2), and achieving “the perfection of market-conforming methods of state intervention in the economy”, in Johnson’s words (1999: 39). This crucial constellation of forces was largely absent in post-colonial Africa, as local private enterprise was still embryonic. As a result the role of the state was enhanced, but its outlook was more consumption than production-oriented. Neopatrimonialism in its diverse facets (clientelism, patronage, nepotism, corruption) became more strongly entrenched than elsewhere, undermining (rather than promoting) officially proclaimed developmental goals.

Without negating the possibility of successful development in Africa - the cases of Botswana and Mauritius are there as evidence -, the more widespread continental feature is the developmental crisis, which has also been identified as a political crisis. The current debate on ‘good governance’ as a condition for development focuses on this political dimension of the crisis. It was initiated by the World Bank in a 1989 report on Sub-Saharan Africa in which it was stated: “Underlying the litany of Africa’s development problems is a crisis of governance. By governance is meant the exercise of political power to manage a nation’s affairs.” (World Bank 1989: 60) The demand for good governance has subsequently become a key component of development discourse in general and the poverty reduction agenda in particular.

In the context of international development policy good governance has come to mean greater efficiency in the management of public affairs through more accountability and transparency and the strengthening of the rule of law. This understanding has been criticised by Leftwich (2000: 105-109) as a purely technical approach to the politics of development (though the Weberian bureaucracy he calls for as a core feature of the developmental state is, as he acknowledges himself, also an expression of good governance) in the sense that the concept neglects the politically key issue of creating an

enabling environment for a development-oriented system and an efficient and accountable public service.

Good governance is also seen by critical observers as a development policy instrument used principally by external donors and International Finance Institutions, in particular, in the context of their structural adjustment policies (Tetzlaff 2003: 485). Given the extent of Zambia's and many other African countries' debt problems this external political condition carries considerable weight. Whether neopatrimonial practices can be overcome through external conditionalities remains doubtful, however (van de Walle 2001). Some critics argue that the instrument provides the IFIs with a welcome argument to defend the soundness of their policies. If their structural adjustment policies fail, blame can be given to institutional weaknesses, i.e. bad governance, in recipient countries (Mkandawire 2004: 381).

Given the aid dependence of African countries the importance of the donors in the political equation is not in doubt. Nevertheless, state-society relations inside each country remain the principal dimension of sustainable institutional change. By the end of the 1980s the deficiencies of existing institutional arrangements, largely one-party regimes, in respect of developmental achievements as well as political freedom had become manifest and opposition to the power-holders was growing. Against this background, Mkandawire in a recent contribution has pointed out, a number of African intellectuals actually put forward the ideas on good governance which subsequently went into the 1989 World Bank report (World Bank 1990). However, the thrust of their ideas did not limit the notion to the "purely administrative" meaning it eventually assumed in the IFIs. For them, "good governance related to the larger issues of state-society relations" (Mkandawire 2004: 381). Spelling out this broader concept in more detail Mkandawire says that:

"the main challenge of development was the establishment of state-society relations that are

(a) developmental, in the sense that they allow the management of the economy in a manner that maximises economic growth, induces structural change, and uses all available resources in a responsible and sustainable manner in highly competitive global conditions;

(b) democratic and respectful of citizens' rights; and

(c) socially inclusive, providing all citizens with a decent living and full participation in national affairs.

Good governance should therefore be judged by how well it sustains this triad." (Mkanadawire 2004: 380)

In one of the background papers which went into the preparation of the 1989 World Bank report Hyden made an important additional observation when he said "that development is not only a matter of economic outputs and social services but the creation of viable structures of governance that involve the private and voluntary sectors as much as the public one." (Hyden 1990: 51)

Good governance, conceived of in this broader sense, does not advocate the weakening of the state, but it also does not see the state doing everything by itself while stifling other creative forces in society. Good governance reflects a more balanced understanding of the relationship between state and civil society. This understanding of good governance departs from post-colonial state-centredness and recognises the need to create political conditions for development, in particular to curb the influence of neopatrimonialism. The strengthening of civil society and participation are seen as important components of the political equation needed to shape the constellation of political forces in a way conducive to development and poverty reduction. On the basis of experiences widespread in Africa it would seem, therefore, that Leftwich's (and Holm's) characterisation of the developmental state in respect of civil society needs to be modified.

To sum up these considerations, this does not mean shifting the focus to forces within civil society. As White (1994, 1995) has pointed out, there is a dialectical relationship between developmental performance and three clusters of power, the state, civil society and international donors, among whom the balance of power is played out. Countries with a weaker development profile are more susceptible to donor influence, but the internal dimension of state-society relations remains crucial. The term "cluster" indicates that each of the three agencies comprises forces with different interests and norms, not all of which will necessarily be development-oriented (White 1994: 386; 1995: 57). Where a neopatrimonial state prevails, a greater burden of working for change rests with civil society forces

but they will need to link up with reform-minded forces within the state and possibly also benefit from donor support to succeed. In the process it will become clear that the dividing line between civil society and state forces is permeable, a fact which might also facilitate the continuity of systemic features in countries where neopatrimonialism is deeply rooted.

5. Zambia's Development Record

Creating an enabling environment for poverty reduction is understood here as establishing the political conditions for development in the Zambian context. This requires reviewing the country's development record since independence, as new departures, should they be envisaged, must necessarily build on the foundations laid and experiences - favourable or unfavourable - made in the past, and draw lessons from them.

Zambia's trajectory since independence can be divided into phases in different ways. In systemic terms, there is much to be said for taking the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Republics, moving from multipartyism to onepartyism and back to multipartyism, as the three main phases (Meysn 2002). Another possibility would be to put more stress on the development strategies pursued which would distinguish two phases essentially, the post-colonial economic nationalist and statist phase under Kaunda and the subsequent neo-liberal phase. Both these approaches would lump Chiluba and Mwanawasa together in one phase. Given that they both won the presidential race on the same party ticket there is nothing basically wrong with either approach. For the purpose of our study, however, it makes sense to distinguish the presidential terms of Zambia's heads of state since independence, Kaunda, Chiluba and Mwanawasa, as the three phases of the country's post-colonial development. Even though the transition from Chiluba to Mwanawasa was a change of government and not a change of the political system, this distinction takes into consideration the presidentialist nature of political rule in Zambia and the resultant influence which the respective office-holders have had on the country's development process.

Kaunda's Economic Nationalism and Tribal Balancing

It is noteworthy, in retrospect, that the initial years in Zambia's post-colonial development which are generally regarded as its best

years, the “fat decade”, as Callaghy reminds us (1990: 286), set the stage simultaneously for the spectacular subsequent demise of the national economy. Astonishingly, if we take Leftwich’s defining features of a developmental state, the Zambian state under Kaunda would seem to have been closer to his requirements than later states. The dedication of the political leadership to development could hardly be questioned. The relative autonomy of the state apparatus was given, considering the low level of social stratification after independence. Admittedly, the quality of the economic bureaucracy was, in the wake of independence, as yet untested and much dependent on the colonial administration. Civil society was weak. The state had a head start on other economic interest groups, with the exception of foreign capital already established in the country. Finally, income was flowing from the copper industry so that the state had ample leeway to embark upon measures of economic transformation while retaining political legitimacy.

Why then did Zambia’s development efforts in the first decade of development fail so badly? It is too simple to put the blame on the collapse of the world market price for copper in the mid-1970s, though nobody would dispute its contributing role. Zambia’s weakness at independence was that its copper wealth was matched by “very weak state capability” (Callaghy 1990: 286). Notwithstanding this fact, the state had very committed ideological ideas of achieving economic after political independence and, using its undisputed authority, embarked on an ambitious statist development strategy which in the years following the end of the copper boom proved to be unsustainable. Dedication to development, it became clear, may be a necessary feature of a developmental state, but it is not sufficient in itself.

Referring back to Chalmer Johnson’s description of the developmental state in Japan as distinct from socialist command economies as well as laissez-faire capitalism, Zambia’s state under Kaunda was more commandist (though also distinct from East bloc socialism) than developmental. It was characterised, as White puts it (partly citing Blair), as “a form of statism in which ‘a government tries to regulate everything, but through a combination of corruption, arbitrariness and its own ineffectiveness ends up controlling virtually nothing at all’” (White 1995: 66). Dependent on the general conditions it faced, but also with a certain inevitability, the state in Zambia became part of the problem.

Besides low state capacity and ideological preferences of decision makers, the third factor which van de Walle, as mentioned above, sees as determining the functioning of many African states, namely clientelism, also characterised this early phase. Given the weakness of local market-based economic activities the state became the main arena for the acquisition of power and prestige, and as the dominant party UNIP provided the entrée to reaping the benefits of independence. Szeftel has described the clientelistic practices of patronage (in exchange for political support) and corruption which were nurtured by the statist policies of the 1st Republic. At times, he says, "it became possible to run public office as a private business" (Szeftel 2000: 210).

Against the background of factional struggles for power and prestige within the ruling party and subsequent challenges to UNIP predominance by breakaway factions, particularly the Bemba-based UPP, Kaunda used his personal authority to introduce a one-party state ostensibly to curb the clientelistic practices which had become increasingly voracious. However, as Szeftel argues, "the one-party state did not end patronage politics; it merely gave the centre more control over it." (2000: 213). By institutionalising his system of "tribal balancing" in the 2nd Republic Kaunda further undermined development efforts by putting people in positions to satisfy certain sections of the elite rather than because of their merit. It was essentially a system of patronage which stabilised Kaunda's personal rule, while leading to increasing nepotism and weakening the rational-legal functioning of the public service. Maintaining his own political power became more important for Kaunda than pursuing the development goals proclaimed after independence.

Notwithstanding adverse world market conditions and the economic problems caused by the liberation struggles in southern Africa, Zambia had favourable conditions to establish a developmental state after independence. Kaunda's personalised style of leadership and his nationalist ideology combined to weaken the state and to impede development. Precipitated by deteriorating terms of trade due to the plunge of the copper price on the world market, the country's economic demise forced it to seek external donor support, but all reform initiatives remained half-hearted and failed to dislodge the statist ideology.

Increasing disaffection among broad sections of the political elite as well as among the impoverished urban population, encouraged

towards the end of the 1980s by the end of the East-West conflict, led to a new constellation of political forces within Zambia. Kaunda's political authority had eroded. His development project had led Zambia from being one of Africa's more wealthy nations after independence to joining the ranks of the continent's poor countries. By the late 1980s per capita income in Zambia had gone down by half. Continuing to follow the slogan born during the post-independence heyday that "only the best is good enough for Zambia" the country was increasingly living above its means and from borrowed money. From 1970 to 1990 Zambia's external debt rose from \$800m. to \$7000m. making the country one of Africa's most highly indebted economies. Donor pressure on the state increased in the course of the 1980s. And within the country the severe economic crisis brought together a broad coalition of civil society forces, some seeking new openings for their personal ambition, others genuinely reform-oriented. Zambia was ready for change.

Chiluba's Paradigm Shift and Personalised Rule

The transition from the 2nd to the 3rd Republic showed how interrelated state and civil society are. Formed in 1990 as a civil society coalition in support of democratic change, the *Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD)* gained political power in 1991 as an anti-Kaunda party led by the long-standing chairman of the country's national trade union federation (ZCTU), Frederick Chiluba. When Chiluba assumed the presidency in 1991 expectations throughout Zambia were high that under his leadership the country would take a turn for the better. MMD had been initiated essentially by a group of intellectuals whose declared aim was to pursue an "agenda for democracy and development" (Mbikusita-Lewanika 2003: 123), leading Zambia into a political future beyond Kaunda's increasingly unpredictable autocratic rule and putting the country's economic and social development on an even keel again.

The conditions for development, however, were much less favourable than they had been at independence. The national economy was at a low ebb; combining a greater openness of public debate with the sacrifices needed to get the economy going again would not be easy. The capacity of the state to effectively guide the process of national recovery was limited as it had to confront entrenched interests in the state economic sector as well as, given the country's high external debt, the pressure of international donors. The

state bureaucracy had suffered from years of deteriorating living conditions and the persistence of patronage politics (Erdmann/Simutanyi 2003: 4-5). The task at hand was, therefore, a major challenge for the new leadership, which did have the advantage that its handsome electoral victory gave it the position of a dominant party in the newly introduced multi-party system.

The MMD did not, however, enter the halls of power as a homogeneous party with a coherent strategic outlook. It was an anti-UNIP party which gained the support of such disparate forces as the powerful trade union movement, local businessmen, and UNIP veterans, some of whom clambered on board with alacrity when UNIP's declining fortunes became apparent. This composition of the party limited the autonomy of the state as different groups were anxious to advance their respective agendas. There were, as Rakner points out, people with a dedicated commitment to economic reform in the initial MMD leadership (Rakner 2003: 79). But there were also leaders, some of whom had already acquired dubious reputations in the Kaunda era, more eager to use their state positions to enhance their private businesses (ibid.: 186). What most observers, however, had underestimated at the inception of the new regime was the power hunger and personal ambition of the newly elected state president.

Chiluba used the legitimacy his government had acquired in the 1991 elections to immediately embark on drastic measures of liberalisation, particularly in the fields of agriculture and trade. In other areas, such as privatisation and public sector reform, he was much less responsive to the adjustment demands of the international donors. Through the measures which it did implement the new regime signalled its departure from Kaunda's statist approach and its adoption of the new paradigm of neo-liberal structural adjustment. International donors responded to this paradigm shift by providing renewed aid flows which Zambia urgently needed to reestablish its capacity to service its external debt. As time passed, however, it became clear that Chiluba's government was principally interested in maintaining aid flows and that neo-liberal reforms were a means to that end. As Rakner puts it, donor conditionalities "were half-heartedly pursued by the two Chiluba administrations in order to fulfil Consultative Group meeting demands rather than because these reforms were part of a domestically formulated development strategy." (Rakner 2003: 168) Lacking a coherent development strategy the effectiveness of those liberalisation measures adopted

remained sub-optimal and the recovery of the economy as a result elusive (ibid.: 85, 155).

Not long into the first legislature of the 3rd Republic conflicts began to erupt among the diverse factions of the ruling MMD, reminiscent of struggles within UNIP in the 1st Republic (Burnell 2001). While reform-minded groups and individuals soon fell by the wayside, business-oriented factions also fought each other (Szeftel 2000: 220). Chiluba made use of his far-reaching powers as president of the state and the party to further consolidate his position. Deeply distrustful of anybody he felt might want to challenge his authority or power he dismissed certain people from his cabinet, while others left of their own accord in protest against rampant corruption.

Chiluba's reaction to ex-president Kaunda's - ill-advised - return to politics in 1994 is symptomatic of the personalised manoeuvres he engaged in to fend off perceived threats to his own power. In order to exclude Kaunda from standing against him in the 1996 elections a clause was introduced into the reformed constitution stipulating that both parents of a presidential candidate must have been born in Zambia. Kaunda's parents had moved to Zambia from Malawi during colonial days. Later he incriminated Kaunda in an abortive coup launched by some misguided soldiers. Other political opponents were sidelined in a similar fashion.

By the end of Chiluba's second term of office his credibility had waned. Social and economic conditions in the country had deteriorated further during the ten years of his rule. Even though Zambia remained a basically stable political system, its ranking on the HDI scale, published annually in the UNDP Human Development Report, fell from 130 (0.461) to 163 (0.386) a decade later, only 12th from the bottom position. Nevertheless, against the will of civil society as well as the donor community, Chiluba thought he could engineer the necessary constitutional changes to secure a third term of office. A new broad civil society coalition, the Oasis Forum, was formed to counter his plans. The conflict came to a head when opposition against his bid formed among MMD and government leaders - more than one of whom were aspiring presidential candidates themselves - and Chiluba arbitrarily expelled 22 of them from the ruling party. With part of the political elite, civil society and the donor community against him, Chiluba saw himself obliged to stand down from his third term ambitions.

Patronage, based on a highly personalised system of giving and receiving favours, stood at the core of Chiluba's power system. Stories of people visiting State House and coming out with brown envelopes tucked away abounded during his rule. In this respect, as Erdmann and Simutanyi point out, the 3rd Republic failed to discard the inheritance of Zambia's 2nd Republic and adopted "its authoritarian political culture and its neopatrimonial institutions" (2003: 62). It even enriched that inheritance when Chiluba introduced the office of District Administrator "as political appointees responsible only to himself" whose role is described as "purely patronage politics on behalf of the president" (ibid.: 48). A presidential slush fund and the secret *Zamtrop* account (The Post, 25.6.2002; 27.6.2002; 5.7.2002), managed on behalf of the president by the special branch chief, round off the picture of patronage and corruption which came to epitomise Chiluba's rule. It is clear that under his tenure Zambia was far from being a developmental state.

Mwanawasa's New Deal and Political Weakness

Apart from the fact that another personality, albeit still on the MMD ticket, took over as president of the country, there are other reasons which justify taking a separate look at Zambia's development prospects since 2001. One of them is that the constellation of political forces also changed as a result of the elections which brought Levy Mwanawasa to power. While MMD had won resounding victories (with the exception of Eastern Province in 1991) in the parliamentary elections in 1991 and 1996, it faced stern opposition in 2001 from several new parties, which - with the exception of UNIP - had all been created out of opposition against Chiluba. It did remain the strongest party in parliament with 69 seats, but faced an opposition of six parties with a total of 81 seats, 49 of which went to UPND. Similarly, in the presidential vote, while Chiluba had twice won with large majorities, Mwanawasa scraped through with the narrowest of margins, i.e. 28.7 percent of the vote against the UPND candidate Mazoka's 26.8 percent.

The circumstances of Mwanawasa's accession to power made him at the outset a weak president. Not only had he won the election by an extremely narrow margin, but he also did not have a very strong position in his own party. Though he had been vice-president during Chiluba's first term of office he resigned in protest against governance irregularities in 1994 (Meysn 1995: 325-333) and

subsequently also gave up his party responsibilities. When Chiluba, after the turmoil surrounding his third term bid, to everybody's surprise proposed Mwanawasa as MMD's presidential candidate, it was generally felt that - apart from needing a candidate not discredited by the third term fracas - he had chosen him so as to be able to continue exercising political influence as party president. Mwanawasa did initially include people in his cabinet who were known as close associates of Chiluba. But he was not a friend of Chiluba's, and it was not long before he began to resent pressure being brought to bear on him by the Chiluba camp and to assert his own authority, forcing Chiluba to give up the MMD party leadership.

The crucial initiative was his announcement early during his tenure that there would be "zero tolerance" for corruption. When this campaign began to address the activities of the former president himself it became clear that Mwanawasa meant to draw a line between himself and his predecessor. Parliament lifted Chiluba's immunity in 2002, and he and seven people from his entourage have been charged on 59 counts of misappropriation of public funds. As Erdmann and Simutanyi note, "Mwanawasa's anti-corruption campaign can be regarded as a first serious attempt to dismantle th(e) predominant pattern of politics" in Zambia, i.e. neopatrimonial rule (2003: 78). The question is whether it will be pursued systematically, as it can come in useful "as a cover for the purging of political opponents in the MMD's Chiluba faction" (ibid.: 69, 78). This question is justified also because Mwanawasa himself benefited from Chiluba's support in the presidential election in 2001, which involved irregular practices as well (Burnell 2002). The case on this issue, brought to court by three leaders of opposition parties and unsuccessful presidential candidates, was, however, finally rejected in February 2005 - after three years of judicial deliberations.

An important feature of neopatrimonial rule is patronage. In the pursuit of a power base beyond his own party Mwanawasa has successfully been using patronage politics. He has offered ministerial positions to members of five opposition parties in parliament, in the process carrying dissent into their ranks. In some cases when people left MMD or were expelled because of disagreements with Chiluba, accepting to return now that his rule has come to an end is understandable. This would apply to FDD members expelled from MMD by Chiluba because of their opposition to his third term bid, or other former MMD members who left the party because Chiluba

departed from the principles of the founding programme and who see Mwanawasa as a member of the founding group of intellectuals willing to return to the source (Mbikusita-Lewanika 2003). Such idealistic motives generally tend to be compatible quite easily with more profane material interests. Mwanawasa's ultimate aim would seem to be directed at forming a coalition beyond the Bemba vote which brought him to power (but may not suffice to keep him there should he, as seems highly probable, stand for a second term). He has offered positions to people in the Western (from UPND and AZ), the North-Western (from UPND), Central (HP) and Lusaka Provinces (FDD, ZRP). In addition he has struck up an agreement with UNIP in Eastern Province. At the same time, he worked diligently to establish his - initially fragile - power base in MMD, finally being constitutionally confirmed as president of the party at the MMD National Convention in July 2005, more than three years into his presidency.

It has become clear from the above that Mwanawasa is much concerned with matters related to the consolidation of his power. The retention of the office of *District Administrators* as local representatives of central power and agents of state patronage is a pertinent case in point. Instead of abolishing the position as had been announced, DAs were renamed *District Commissioners* in an act of pure window dressing. This is not a situation well suited to the development orientation of his government.

However, the electoral slogan he chose of offering "continuity with change" and a "new deal" did suggest that he would seek a middle path between Kaunda's statist strategy and Chiluba's neo-liberal strategy giving the state a more pronounced role than had been the case previously. Apart from the anti-corruption drive, which has not been making the progress before the courts which the public in Zambia has been expecting, other initiatives were also well received. The announcement of a national decentralisation policy was seen as a potentially important step towards greater participation of local people and local authorities in development processes. Similarly, the Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability (PEMFA) initiative could strengthen the rational-legal functioning of the state bureaucracy. What critical observers still miss though is a coherent overall development strategy.

Given Zambia's continuing precarious position vis-à-vis international donors it clearly faces pressure from that side. After

having failed to meet the conditions of the PRGF in mid-2003 due to lack of budgetary discipline Zambia finally achieved the desired *HIPC completion point* in early 2005 and is set to benefit from the considerable debt relief that entails. Donors alone should not be blamed, however, for a lack of coherent strategy. The HIPC process has provided recipient countries with a window of opportunity which they can use by putting forward good concepts. As Eberlei shows in his contribution to this volume donors have committed themselves to the principle of alignment to enhance the ownership of development strategies.

In a sense the Mwanawasa administration inherited a somewhat advantageous development situation when it took over, as the donor-backed *Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP)* was in place with a clear focus of improving people's livelihoods in the country. The fact that the PRSP process is premised on participation mechanisms which incorporate civil society organisations should also be seen as providing an opportunity to weaken the impact of corrupt practices. On the other hand, given the entrenched tradition of neopatrimonial rule in Zambia's political system putting the burden of change on civil society forces is certainly asking too much of them. Reform-minded forces in the state apparatus must of necessity also become involved in the process.

Current disputes in the Zambian polity relate principally to the legitimacy of the regime. Having initiated a basically desirable constitutional review debate the government was intent on keeping the process under its control. Civil society, represented by the Oasis Forum, insisted on greater openness demanding that a new constitution should be submitted to a referendum. The fact that government could not simply ignore civil society's interventions showed that their voice had gained political weight. Mwanawasa's manoeuvres, however, seemed to be directed towards retaining his own power. A major substantial issue which has emerged in the constitutional debate is the re-introduction of a majority vote in the presidential election (which Chiluba had replaced by a plurality in 1996). By proposing to extend the whole process of adopting a new constitution beyond the 2006 elections Mwanawasa would, as in 2001, only need a plurality of the vote to secure re-election, evidently fearing that he might lose if he required a majority. At the time of writing the dispute over these issues was ongoing. Whatever does

ensue, the apparent primordial concern with personalised power seems to be at the top of Mwanawasa's agenda as well.

6. A Tentative Conclusion

It is not feasible at this point, four years into the tenure of the current administration, to give more than a tentative conclusion to our initial question whether Zambia's political system can deliver the goods, i.e. provide the conditions needed to achieve poverty reduction. The three governments Zambia has had since independence have each had their distinctive features, but they have also had similarities. Among the latter the highly personalised rule of the three presidential officeholders figures strongly. The fact that their regimes did at the same time reflect a degree of continuity of neopatrimonial rule as well is particularly relevant in respect of the country's development prospects. It suggests that Zambia's development problems might well continue.

However, we should not ignore Mkandawire's observation that neopatrimonial practices do not categorically exclude developmental progress. Obviously this is a matter of degree. As Erdmann and Simutanyi note in their study, the Mwanawasa government has shown signs of departing from previously predominant patterns of politics in Zambia, which are noteworthy. They refer principally to the anti-corruption campaign. In terms of the economic situation some hopeful developments have also occurred. The foreign exchange rate has remained fairly stable and this has helped keep the inflation rate within tolerable limits. Following the food shortages in 2002 and 2003, the 2003/2004 season benefited from good rains to produce a bumper harvest even allowing Zambia to export some food surplus to neighbouring countries. The successful efforts to reach the HIPC completion point, after missing the goal in 2003, should also be registered on the positive side of the balance sheet.

There were, on the other hand, persistent signs of continuing corruption. The reports of subsidised fertiliser earmarked for small-scale peasants through the *Fertilizer Support Programme* finding its way to commercial traders were a case in point. Deficiencies in economic governance, for instance regarding the Food Reserve Agency's purchase of maize crops from marginal production areas, impacted negatively on the poverty reduction aims in the agricultural

sector. The “new deal” proclaimed by the Mwanawasa administration has so far not materialised as a coherent development strategy.

There can be little doubt that Zambia’s political system is permeated by neopatrimonial practices. If we maintain that the creation of conditions needed to achieve poverty reduction is nevertheless possible, the question must follow how that perspective can be strengthened. The strong focus currently being placed on constitutional reform, important as it is, may not be the key answer in respect of prospects for development. In his study, which covered the Kaunda and Chiluba eras, Szeftel came to the conclusion that constitutional change seems “to have affected patterns of clientelism and corruption very little” (2000: 221). All experience suggests that what is crucial is the dedication of leadership towards developmental goals.

The continuity of politics in Zambia, however, suggests as well that the state with its tradition of highly personalised and patronage-based rule cannot be expected to pursue such a trajectory by itself. There are certainly reform-minded forces in the state and in the government bureaucracy, but they need support from other walks of society. The disputes surrounding the constitutional reform process do show that civil society forces in Zambia have gained self-confidence and some degree of influence. It would be unrealistic, however, to expect them to become the driving force by themselves. Closer cooperation between the Oasis Forum and some opposition political parties in the public debate on the constitution indicate possibilities of broadening the reform coalition. Simply focusing on another change of government in 2006 - ending perhaps in more of the same under another ambitious leader - will not do though. The coalition needs to link up with reform-minded forces in the state in this or any subsequent administration to further the country’s developmental aims. Donors should throw their weight behind reform forces without departing from the alignment policy they have proclaimed as crucial to the PRSP process. Creating conditions to achieve poverty reduction in short requires creating a constellation of political forces within society conducive to development. It is clearly not a straightforward task to create such a balance of forces in Zambia, but is there any other way forward?

References

- Anyang Nyong'o, Peter (1988a): Political Instability and the Prospects for Democracy in Africa, in: *Africa Development*, Vol. 13, No. 1
- Anyang Nyong'o, Peter (1988b): A Rejoinder to the Comments on Democracy and Political Instability, in: *Africa Development*, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 83-87
- Burnell, Peter (2001): The Party System and Party Politics in Zambia: Continuities Past, Present and Future, in: *African Affairs*, Vol. 100, pp. 239-263
- Burnell, Peter (2002): Zambia's 2001 elections: the tyranny of small decisions, 'non-decisions' and 'not decisions', in: *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 6, pp. 1103-1120
- Callaghy, Thomas M. (1990): Lost Between State and Market: The Politics of Economic Adjustment in Ghana, Zambia, and Nigeria, in: Nelson, Joan M. (ed.): *Economic Crisis and Policy Choice. The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 257-319
- Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR) (2002): *The Path away from Poverty. An Easy Look at Zambia's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2002-2004*. Lusaka: CSPR,
- Doornbos, Martin (1990), *The African State in Academic Debate: Retrospect and Prospect*, in: *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 179-198
- Erdmann, Gero/Simutanyi, Neo (2003): *Transition in Zambia: The Hybridisation of the Third Republic*. Lilongwe: Konrad Adenauer Foundation
- Evans, P.B./Rueschemeyer, D./Skocpol, T. (eds.) (1985): *Bringing the State Back In*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Holm, John D. (1996): Development, Democracy and Civil Society in Botswana, in: Leftwich, Adrian (ed.): *Democracy and Development. Theory and Practice*. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 97-113
- Hyden, Goran (1990): The Changing Context of Institutional Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, in: World Bank (ed.): *The Long-Term Perspective Study of Sub-Saharan Africa. Background Papers, Vol. 3: Institutional and Sociopolitical Issues*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, pp. 43-59
- Illy, Hans F./Sielaff, Rüdiger/Werz, Nikolaus (1980): *Diktatur - Staatsmodell für die Dritte Welt?* Freiburg/Würzburg: Verlag Ploetz
- Johnson, Chalmers (1982): *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy 1925-1975*. Stanford: Stanford University Press

- Johnson, Chalmers (1999): *The Developmental State: Odyssey of a Concept*, in: Woo-Cumings, Meredith (ed.): *The Developmental State*. Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, pp. 32-60
- Keane, John (1988): *Democracy and Civil Society*. London/New York: Verso
- Leftwich, Adrian (2000): *States of Development. On the Primacy of Politics in Development*. Cambridge: Polity Press
- Lipset, Seymour Martin (1981) (first published 1960): *Political Man. The Social Bases of Politics*, expanded edition. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press
- Mair, Stefan/Braun, Markus (1995): *Vertragen sich Demokratie und Sozioökonomische Entwicklung? SWP - AP 2935*. Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
- Mbikusita-Lewanika, Akashambatwa (2003): *Hour for Reunion. Movement for Multi-Party Democracy: Conception, Dissension and Reconciliation*. Mongu-Lealui/Lusaka: African Lineki Courier
- Medard, Jean François (1982): *The Underdeveloped State in Tropical Africa: Political Clientelism or Neopatrimonialism?*, in: Clapham, Christopher (ed.): *Private Patronage and Public Power. Political Clientelism in the Modern State*. London: Frances Pinter, pp. 162-192
- Meyns, Peter (1995): *Zambia in der 3. Republik: Demokratische Transition und Politische Kontinuität. Analyse und Dokumentation*. Hamburg: Institut für Afrika-Kunde
- Meyns, Peter (2002): *Dekolonisation in Sambia: Eine akteursorientierte Sicht*, in: Brandstetter, Anna-Maria/Neubert, Dieter (eds.): *Postkoloniale Transformation in Afrika*. Hamburg: LIT Verlag, pp. 159-177
- Mkandawire, Thandika (1988): *Comments on Democracy and Political Instability*, in: *Africa Development*, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 77-82
- Mkandawire, Thandika (2001): *Thinking about developmental states in Africa*, in: *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, Vol. 25, pp. 289-313
- Mkandawire, Thandika (2004): *Good Governance – the itinerary of an idea*, in: *Development and Cooperation*, 10 (October)/2000
- Myrdal, Gunnar (1971): *Politisches Manifest über die Armut in der Welt*. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp
- Rakner, Lise (2003): *Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991-2001*. Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute
- Shivji, Issa (1987/88): *Marxism and Socialism in Africa: Some Reflections*, in: *Southern Africa Political and Economic Monthly*, No. 3 & 4, Dec. 1987/Jan. 1988

- Szeftel, Morris (2000): "Eat With Us": Managing Corruption and Patronage Under Zambia's Three Republics, 1964-99, in: *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 207-224
- Tetzlaff, Rainer (2003): Good Governance und Neopatrimonialismus in Afrika südlich der Sahara - ein Widerspruch?, in: *Nord-Süd aktuell*, Jg. 17, Nr. 3, pp. 478-486
- van de Walle, Nicolas (2001): *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- White, Gordon (1994): Civil Society, Democratization and Development (I): Clearing the Analytical Ground, in: *Democratization*, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 375-390
- White, Gordon (1995): Civil Society, Democratization and Development (II): Two Country Cases, in: *Democratization*, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 56-84
- Woo-Cumings, Meredith (1999): Introduction: Chalmers Johnson and the Politics of Nationalism and Development, in: Woo-Cumings, M. (ed.): *The Developmental State*. Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, pp. 1-31
- World Bank (1989): *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth. A Long-Term Perspective Study*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank
- World Bank (ed.) (1990): *The Long-Term Perspective Study of Sub-Saharan Africa. Background Papers, Vol. 3: Institutional and Sociopolitical Issues*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank

Meys, Peter (2005): Achieving Poverty Reduction – Can Zambia's Political System Deliver the Goods? In: Eberlei, Walter / Meys, Peter / Mutesa, Fred (eds.) (2005): Poverty Reduction in a Political Trap? The PRS Process and Neopatrimonialism in Zambia. Lusaka: UNZA Press, 29-56